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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTION OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION OVER LOCAL RATE REGULATION
BY CHARLES E. CULLEN
Although the federal courts have been expanded quantitatively
to meet the growing needs of the country, and have, from time
to time, been given added jurisdiction by Congress, there has
always existed a policy of keeping specific classes of litigation
out of the lower federal courts., Many people, furthermore, have
been impressed with the idea that the federal courts afford op-
portunities, through removal of causes to them because of diver-
sity of citizenship 2 or other reasons, for escape from state law,
state regulation and the duties of local citizenship. 3 Four types
of restriction of the jurisdiction of federal district courts were
offered in recently proposed legislation in Congress:4 elimination
of jurisdiction involving diversity of citizenship; denial of the
right of removal to foreign corporations on the ground of diver-
sity of citizenship ;5 increases in jurisdictional amount involved;
and denial of jurisdiction to interfere by injunction or otherwise
in intrastate utility regulation cases. The last springs from
1The controversy over the proper extent of concurrent jurisdiction of
lower federal courts and of state courts began in the Constitutional Con-
vention. Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,
(1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483; Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts, (1928) 13 Cornell L. Q. 499.
Many specific acts limit the jurisdiction of the district courts, among them:
24 Stat. 552 (1887); 36 Stat. 291 (1910); 43 Stat. 938 and 43 Stat. 941
(1925).
2 Paul Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies between
Citizens of Different States Be Preserved? (1932) 18 A. B. A. Jour. 499.
See discussion of the part played by the Supreme Court in allaying this
irritation in, Federal and State Court Interference, by Charles Warren, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1930).
3 Charles N. Campbell, Is Swift v. Tyson an Argument for or against
Abolishing Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction? (1932) 18 A. B. A. Jour.
809.
'On the Norris bill see discussion in The Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts based on Diversity of Citizenship. Robert C. Brown, 78 Univ. of
Pa. L. Rev. 179 (1929). Hon. J. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Re-
cent Attacks Upon It, (1932) 18 A. B. A. Jour. 433. Mr. Howland's Article,
supra note 2. Memorandum of views of the Chicago University Law School
Faculty, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1932), on then pending legislation: Senate
Bill No. 939, House Bill No. 11508 (The Norris-La Guardia bill); Senate
Bill No. 937, House Bill No. 10594 (Attorney General's bill); Senate Bill
No. 3243 (Johnson Bill) and House Bill No. 4526 (The Bulwinkle Bill).
5 There are numerous law review articles voicing the opposition to the
ruling that foreign corporations are citizens in diversity of citizenship cases
as laid down in Railroad v. Letson (1884) 2 How. (43 U. S.) 497; (1927)
Black and White Taxi Co. Case (1927) 276 U. S. 518 and others.
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aroused interest in the public utility problem and the enormous
amount of litigation and expense arising from the efforts of util-
ity management to mitigate, delay or avoid state regulation.
Known as the "Johnson bill," it was enacted into law as of May
14, 1934, amending the first paragraph of section 24 of the Judi-
cial Code, as follows:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this para-
graph, no district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit
to enjoin, suspend, or restrain the enforcement, operation
or execution of any order of an administrative board or
commission of a State, or any rate-making body of any politi-
cal subdivision thereof, or to enjoin, suspend, or restrain
any action in compliance with any such order, where juris-
diction is based solely upon the ground of diversity of citi-
zenship, or the repugnance of such order to the Constitution
of the United States, where such order (1) affects rates
chargeable by a public utility, (2) does not interfere with
interstate commerce, and (3) has been made after reason-
able notice and hearing, and where a plain, speedy, and effi-
cient remedy may be had at law, or in equity in the courts
of such State."
The second section of the amendment provides that suits
already pending shall not be affected.6
This amendment purports to take away the nisi prius juris-
diction of the matters therein mentioned from the district courts.
Will it stand the test of constitutionality? Will it be effective in
the attainment of a long sought objective: the strengthening of
administrative boards and commissions within the states in the
perplexing field of utility regulation? What treatment is it re-
ceiving at the hands of the courts?
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY
1. AS A LAWFUL EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
The law known as the Judicial Code of the United States,
under which the present lower courts of the federal system are
created and organized, was adopted by Act of Congress, March
3, 1911 and put in force January 1, 1912.T It marked the aboli-
tion of the Circuit Courts which had existed from the beginning
of the Federal Government and a recognition of expanding needs.
6 48 Stat. Part 1, 775, amending 36 Stat. 1091, U. S. C. p. 866; 28 U. S.
C. A. 41 (1).
7 36 Stat. 1087, 28 U. S. C. A., p. 3.
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It has been subjected to constant amendment in the manner that
the Johnson Act amends it, and its entire subject matter is a
recognition of the legislative power of Congress over the juris-
diction to be exercised by the district federal courts. Under it
they are courts of distinctly limited jurisdiction. The power of
Congress in this field would seem to be so well established that
it could not be questioned yet it was made an issue in one of the
cases discussed later herein.8
2. UNDER THE "DUE PROCESS" PROVISION
That the constitutionality of the Johnson Act would be tested
in the particular districts upon the issue of due process in the
state courts was foreseeable in the language of the last part of
section one: "where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be
had at law, or in equity in the courts of such state." Judge
Parker has made a strong point of the difference between the
state and federal courts in the matter of judicial review., So had
Mr. David E. Lillienthal.10 Those urging the defects of the provi-
sions for such review in the states go back to the famous state-
ment of Mr. Justice Holmes: "If the railroads were required to
take no active steps until they could bring a writ or error from
this court to the Supreme Court of Appeals after a final judg-
ment, they would come here with the facts already found against
them. But the determination as to their rights turns almost
wholly upon the facts found. Whether their property was taken
unconstitutionally depends upon the valuation of the property,
the income to be derived from the proposed rates and the propor-
tion between the two-pure matters of fact. When those are
settled the law is tolerably plain.'1 This statement indicates
8 Numerous opinions from Turner v. Bank, (1799) 4 DalI. (4 U. S.) 10
down to Kline v. Burke Construction Co., (1922) 260 U. S. 226 have ac-
cepted or upheld the power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the
courts which it "may from time to time ordain and establish," Constitution,
Art. III, Sec. 1. Jurisdiction may be withdrawn even in a pending case.
Ex Parte Yerger (1869) 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 104; The Assessors v. Osborne
(1869) 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 567, 575. See the argument of Mr. Howland
and Mr. Parker, regarding the necessity for Congress to place the fulljudicial power set forth in the Constitution in the courts it creates, in the
articles cited in foregoing notes. The latter view was advanced in Mis-
sissippi Power and Light Co. v. City of Jackson, commented on hereafter.
9Note 4, supra. The federal court would in theory show its own fact
findings, the state record might review only part of a board's findings.
10 The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities, 43 Harv.
L. Rev. 379. Part of his statement is the text to note 21, post.
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that the state court record, based on a finding of facts by an
extra-judicial body, the commission, is not such a record as will
satisfy the judicial review. The court should make its own in-
vestigation of the facts in an impartial way. It implies that the
courts will do this and the tenor of the decision is that the alloca-
tion of the judicial power under the constitution requires courts
to do this independently.
Crowell v. Benson' supports the viewpoint that the delegation
of the finding of facts to an administrative body or its repre-
sentative is not constitutional, absent any provision, express or
implied, for judicial review. In that case the principle laid down
does seem to be true as to specific facts, i. e. the two jurisdic-
tional facts, and the court held that, absent an express provision,
such a power to review to determine the existence of such facts
is implicit. If Congress intended otherwise the law would be
unconstitutional in its denial of due process, and unconstitution-
ality will not be presumed. Chief Justice Hughes considered such
a review indispensable under the definition of the judicial power
in the Constitution. Its absence "would be to sap the judicial
power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to estab-
lish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our sys-
tem, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently
they do, upon the facts, and the finality as to facts becomes in
effect finality in law. ' 13 "In cases brought to enforce constitu-
tional rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily
extends to the independent determination of all questions, both
of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme
function. The case of confiscation is illustrative, the ultimate
conclusion almost invariably depending upon the decisions of
questions of fact. This court has held the owner to be entitled
to 'a fair opportunity for submitting the issue to a judicial
tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment
as to both law and facts' -14 (citing Ohio Valley Water Co. v.
Ben Avon Borough's and other cases.) "We think that the essen-
11 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. (1908) 211 U. S. at 228.12 Crowell v. Benson (1932) 285 U. S. 22. See comments, 30 Mich. L.
Rev. 1312; 80 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 1055; 21 Calif. L. Rev. 266.
1S Crowell v. Benson, supra note 12, p. 57.
14 Ibid.. p. 60.
Is (1920) 253 U. S. 287. Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion,
Brandeis, Holmes and Clark, JJ., dissenting.
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tial independence of the exercise of the judicial power of the
United States in the enforcement of constitutional rights re-
quires that the Federal Court should determine such an issue
upon its own record and the facts elicited before it."16 The dis-
sent of Justices Brandeis, Stone and Roberts does not seem to
the writer to afford much comfort to those who disagree with
the majority opinion. They favored reversal on a mere techni-
cality, namely that the trial court should be reversed because his
decision was wrong in requiring a trial de novo, instead of a
judicial review of the existence of certain facts. Had they repre-
sented a majority, their decision would very easily have been
misinterpreted as dispensing with judicial review. It is not be-
lieved that these justices intended any such result. The majority
view certainly lays down the principle that there must be such
a trial by an independent tribunal of the issues regarding the
existence of certain "pivotal" facts, whether we call them "juris-
dictional facts" or by some other name. As Mr. Dickinson says,
"The practical result of the doctrine of jurisdictional fact is to
throw open for complete re-examination in court facts, which,
if they were not held to be "jurisdictional," would be concluded
either by the decision of the administrative body or at least by
the evidence at its disposal. This doctrine has an obviously dif-
ferent incidence and value when applied to some types of admin-
istrative decisions and officers from what it has when applied to
others."'11 He draws a distinction between summary decisions by
an inspector and the formal decisions rendered as the result of
hearing testimony and argument which are preserved in a writ-
ten record.
In the Ben Avon case,1 & the court said: "Looking at the entire
opinion we are compelled to conclude that the Supreme Court
interpreted the statute as withholding from the courts power to
determine the question of confiscation according to their own in-
dependent judgment when the action of the Commission comes
to be considered on appeal .... In all such cases, if the owner
claims confiscation of his property will result, the State must
provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial
16 Crowell v. Benson, supra note 12, p. 64.
17 Crowell v. Benson, Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of
Constitutional Fact. John Dickinson, 80 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. at 1060.
27-Note 15, supra.
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tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment
as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void because in
conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment."18
The repetition of the necessity for independent judgment by the
courts is important. If the statutory appeal provided for is not
judicial in character, or is merely legislative as in the Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co. case, constitutional protection under due
process is not provided for, and this is important under the
Johnson Act, because practically all rate cases involve the issue
of confiscation. The dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Ben
Avon case does not afford comfort to the opponents of duplicate
fact finding: "Where a State offers a litigant the choice of two
methods of judicial review, of which one is both appropriate and
unrestricted, the mere fact that the other which the litigant elects
is limited, does not amount to a denial of the constitutional right
to a judicial review.'J19 It is to be noted that he seems positive
of the "constitutional right" to a judicial review.
Due process involves judicial review and for that purpose
there must be a record to review. Admitting that it must show
reasonable notice and hearing with opportunity to present evi-
dence and arguments, deemed vital, it is bound to present enough
to assist the court in determining whether error of law was com-
mitted. Mr. Dickinson admits that this includes "the question
whether it reached conclusions of fact which could not have been
reached on the same evidence by reasonable men.12 0 This would
seem to require more than the determination of jurisdictional
facts, for a commission might very well have proof of its juris-
diction in the matter, yet find the facts of value and return there-
on so as to produce confiscation of property. It seems that the
record presented for court review must present findings of other
than jurisdictional facts as such. The difference between the
state and federal court review in establishing such a record has
been fully set forth by Mr. Lillienthal. He maintained that, "Un-
less an adequate record is before the state supreme court when
it reviews the commission order, effective appeal to the United
Stats Supreme Court is out of the question. In those states in
which review may be denied simply upon representations in the
Is Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1919) 253 U. S. at page 289.
19 Ibid., 1. c. 295.
20 80 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev., 1. c. 1061.
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petition for review and without the court having a complete
record before it, state review is hazardous and resort to the
federal court in the first instance a plain necessity." 21 Judge
Parker and Mr. Lillienthal differed from Mr. Frankfurter in
regard to the merits of and need for state jurisdiction in prefer-
ence to federal jurisdiction in utility litigation but the two former
based their opinions on the procedure and the record from a
practical standpoint. Mr. Warren had pointed out the same diffi-
culty facing local jurisdictions. The opinions of Mr. Justice
Holmes, Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice McReynolds,2 2
without citing others, indicate a unanimity of thought on the
part of the Supreme Court majorities, and indeed of the other
justices, that the judicial review is indispensable, except in the
findings of certain administrative bodies created by Congress.23
II. WILL THE JOHNSON ACT AID IN SOLVING THE UTILITY
PROBLEM?
The discussion above under due process seems to indicate a
favorable answer to this question only where the states provide
for judicial review that will meet the requirements of the act
itself: "where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had
at law, or in equity in the courts of such State." Direct efforts
by the states to compel litigation of local causes against foreign
corporations or non-residents in the local courts have largely
failed where the mode was prohibition of removal to the federal
courts or making submission to local judicial jurisdiction a con-
dition of doing business within the state.24 Incorporation in a
foreign state for the purpose of creating a diversity of citizen-
ship and obtaining the benefit of removal to federal courts is
annoying, but not invalid.25 The few instances where the Su-
2 1 Article, supra note 10.
22 Supra notes 11, 12, and 15.
23 Crowell v. Benson (supra note 12) p. 50. "Thus the Congress, in exer-
cising the powers confided to it, may establish 'legislative' courts (as distin-
guished from constitutional courts in which the judicial power conferred by
the Constitution can be deposited)-to examine and determine various mat-
ters, arising between the government and others, which, from their nature do
not require judicial determination: and yet are susceptible of it." (quoted from
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272.)
For a survey of the conclusiveness of fact findings by administrative bodies
of the Federal Government, see Conclusiveness of the Federal Trade Com-
mission's Findings of Facts. Gregory Hankin, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 233 (1924).24 Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 529.
2 5 Regan v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. (1893) 154 U. S. 362, 391;
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preme Court has sustained concurrent jurisdiction in cases where
there was diverse citizenship do not benefit the utility issues.26
The Johnson Act affords the states opportunity to secure ade-
quate control of the regulation of utilities in a fair and constitu-
tional manner, and it seems wise for them to adjust their pro-
cedure so as to meet the requirements of due process that may be
learned from the adjudicated cases.
Procedure, provided in the various states for appeals from
public utility commissions or other boards under various names,
places the states in three groups. The first group provides for
judicial review upon appeal, allows injunctive relief upon vary-
ing terms suspending the rates or requiring bonds in the interim
and the like, and does not prescribe nor limit the types or extent
of evidence to be considered by the courts. A second group pro-
vides by statutes for appeals from orders of the commission, with
an alternative remedy of injunction in some jurisdictions, but
limits the evidence to be reviewed by the courts to that produced
before the commission or more strictly, in some jurisdictions, to
that involved in an application for a rehearing before the com-
mission, with added limitation on the powers of the appellate
court to reject or modify the administrative ruling. The third
group provides by constitutional provision for an administrative
board having a combination of legislative, executive and judicial
functions, with limited provisions for appeal to some court, usu-
ally the supreme court of the state and decided restrictions on
the power of the appellate court in the matter of review.26 1
The problem of the federal district courts under the Johnson
Act is bound up with the state provisions. The district judge or
Black and White Taxi Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxi Co. (1927) 276 U. S.
518.
26 Klime v. Burke Construction Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 226. Here the Su-
preme Court reiterated the doctrine that the lower federal courts secure
their jurisdiction "wholly from authority of Cofigress."
26" Statutes of the first type: Code of Alabama, 1923, sections 9691, 9692,
9699; R. S. Mo. 1929, sections 5234-5237; Illinois Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd)
1927, Chap. 1112, sec. 72.
Statutes of the second type: General Laws of California (Deering) 1931,
Art. 6386, section 67; Digest of Statutes of Arkansas, Crawford and Moses,
1921, section 1698 (no new evidence, record before the commission, appeal
to Supreme Court, section 1699) ; Compiled Laws of Colorado, 1921, Sections
2960 et seq.
Constitutional provisions, third type: Oklahoma, Art. 9, section 18, in
Statutes of Oklahoma, Harlow, 1931, section 13598; Virginia Code, 1924,
The Michie Co., Article XII, sections 156, d-g.
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a three judge court must decide whether jurisdiction has been
denied under the act. In the first group above, it would seem
clear that the district court has no jurisdiction. In the second
group there would arise the problem offered by the Ben Avon
case. In the third group the Prentis case would have to be con-
sidered. Consideration would be generously given to the inter-
pretation of the supreme courts of the various states, with the
knowledge that such cases would probably be before the Supreme
Court of the United States on writ of error. Such procedure will
involve no insignificant delays. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting
in the Ben Avon case, said, "The objections to the valuation made
by the company raise no question of law but concern pure mat-
ters of fact; and the finding of the Commission, affirmed by the
highest court of the State, is conclusive upon this court."27 But
he had previously admitted that, "This court may, of course,
upon writ or error to a state court 'examine the entire record,
including the evidence,-to determine whether what purports to
be a finding upon questions of fact is so involved with and de-
pendent upon questions of law as to be in substance and effect
a decision of the latter.' ',28 The rate regulation cases, involving
unlawful deprivation of property, are such that the fact-issue is
decisive of the constitutionality.2 That the benefits of the John-
son Act may accrue to all of the states, it is believed that states
in the second and third group, as classified above, should take
steps to provide for a judicial review which will meet the re-
quirements of the decisions heretofore mentioned. The benefits
are too great to be sacrificed to administrative independence.
III. THE CASES
Several cases involving the application of the Johnson Act
have reached the district courts. In Georgia Continental Tele-
phone Co. v. Georgia, Public Service Commission,o on July 13,
1934, a three judge court denied an interlocutory injunction
against an order of the commission and dismissed the proceeding
without prejudice to a bill in the state courts covering the same
subject matter. An interlocutory order had been issued previ-
ously, enjoining an order of the commission affecting rates of the
27 253 U. S. at p. 299.
25 253 U. S. at p. 298.
29 U. of Pa. L. Rev., p. 1072.
30 8 F. Supp. 434.
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utility. Later, after further investigation, a new order was is-
sued by the commission and in the meantime the Johnson Act
became law. Although the act provides for retention of juris-
diction in cases pending at the time of its enactment, it would
seem that the court properly ruled that the supplemental pro-
ceeding to bring the new order within the scope of the pending
suit was not within the proviso. The court decided that the hear-
ing before the state commission was not unreasonable, was based
on facts and data furnished by the plaintiff, and these were not
claimed by the utility to be wrong or mistaken. In answer to the
claim that the commission considered other evidence in its files
not a part of the records before them, it was shown that this con-
sisted of annual reports of the utility and answers by it to a
questionnaire and that these could not be matter of surprise. A
State Court had held that under the Georgia law, the Commission
in fixing a future rate acts legislatively and like a legislature is
not bound to grant any hearing, but if it does so, it is a matter
of grace. While doubting that a subordinate legislative agency
may consistently with due process fix rates without a hearing,
the court pointed out that the Johnson Act denied jurisdiction
to the federal court if, in fact, reasonable notice was given and
a hearing held. Holding that if it were an original bill it ought
to be dismissed as not within the jurisdiction of the court, this
court, in the exercise of discretion, held that the supplemental
proceeding ought not to be entertained. One of the judges, Judge
W. I. Grubb, dissented. An interesting contention of the utility
was that the commissioners were disqualified because of coercion
by the governor and for financial interest, in as much as the
governor had been elected on a reduction of rates platform and
the commissioners appointed to carry it out. This was not given
much consideration, the court saying: "Courts will test these acts
on their several merits, but will not investigate the politics of
appointment."
On the allegations of the bill it is evident that the court re-
tained jurisdiction solely to determine whether the claim of lack
of due process was upheld. That being present, it was without
further jurisdiction. If the Georgia state court was right in hold-
ing that the commission acts legislatively, will that make any
difference in the appeal to the state courts? Does the fact that
the state court held that the commission need not give notice and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss4/1
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hold a hearing constitute an obstacle to due process later when
the utility seeks its remedy in that court? We shall look forward
to the outcome of this case, if it is litigated further, in the light
of the leading cases heretofore discussed. Constitutionality from
the standpoint of the power of Congress to pass the Johnson Act
was not presented.
In Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. City of Jackson, Miss.,"'
an injunction was sought to restrain the enforcement of a munici-
pal ordinance which reduced the rates charged for electricity, on
the grounds that they would result in confiscation. A transcript
of the stenographer's notes of the proceedings before the mayor
and commissioners showed that there were due notice, hearings,
appearances of plaintiff's authorized representatives, request for
definite figures from the utility to furnish evidence to sustain
the current rates, and persistent refusal to do so. The federal
judge refused an injunction on the ground that there was avail-
able a plain remedy in the chancery courts of the state of Mis-
sissippi, and sustained the constitutionality of the Johnson Act
and therefore the inapplicability of the Declaratory Judgments
act to the situation. The evidence of due notice and hearing sus-
tained the ruling that there was no lack of due process before the
commissioners. The suggestion that the state laws conferred
upon the state courts legislative powers in matters of appeal in
rate issues was answered thus: "Comity requires that in a case
of this character we leave the state court to deal with the con-
stitutionality of a state statute applicable to its own judicial sys-
tem." However, authority of state decisions was shown that the
state chancery court had independent jurisdiction to pass on con-
fiscation issues raised by municipal ordinance.
It was urged that the phrase, "solely upon the ground of diver-
sity of citizenship or the repugnance of such order to the consti-
tution," in the Johnson Act disclosed an intent to withdraw juris-
diction from the federal courts only where one such ground was
raised and not where both were present. The court ruled that the
word solely modifies the compound phrase and means in the ab-
sence of some other valid ground of federal jurisdiction. The
claim that the restriction of the judicial power of the United
States in limiting the jurisdiction of the district court in such
31 9 F. Supp. 564, January 24, 1935.
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issues as confiscation was unconstitutional was evidently argued
by attorneys for the utility with much force, since the court went
to considerable length to overrule this contention in a scholarly
historical presentation of the rulings on this issue.
This case, like the preceding one, presents the situation raised
by the Johnson Act in its most favorable light and leaves the
states their duty of furnishing due process. If the Mississippi
and Georgia courts have not, under their judicial codes, the
power to provide due process, we may look again to repetition of
the arguments of the Ben Avon case in the Supreme Court.
On February 9, 1935, in the District Court for the Western
Division of the State of Oklahoma, a three judge court handed
down its opinion in Cary v. Corporation Commission of Okla-
homa.32 The bill of complaint alleged that the Corporation Com-
mission had made an order reducing the price which the plaintiff
might charge his customers for gas from 25 cents to 18 cents per
thousand cubic feet; that the order had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in pursuance of the legislative power
conferred upon it by the state constitution; and that the order
deprived the plaintiff of its property, since the rates were con-
fiscatory. As a distinct ground for equitable relief plaintiff al-
leged that the order was in conflict with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, in that no court
of the state, acting in a judicial capacity, may inquire into or re-
view the order complained of. A motion to dismiss was filed by
the defendants on the ground that under the Johnson Act, the
court was without jurisdiction. Owing to the uncertainty and
conflict in the state decisions, the majority of the court felt that
it could not do otherwise than grant the temporary injunction
until the supreme court of the state determined that the Okla-
homa constitutional plan of utility control affords a judicial re-
view, in some state court, of an order of the Corporation Com-
mission affecting rates chargeable by a public utility. Since the
jurisdiction of the federal courts is restricted by the Johnson
Act only "where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had
at law or in equity in the courts of such State" the three judges
were of the unanimous opinion that "it cannot now be said that
there is a 'plain' remedy in the courts of the state." If review
329 F. Supp. 709. A bond to cover the difference between the existing
and proposed rates was required in the interim.
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by the supreme court of Oklahoma is found to be "legislative"
and but the "last step in the administrative machinery," plain-
tiff could not appeal from an adverse ruling to the Supreme
Court of the United States in a matter of confiscation of prop-
erty, and would be deprived of the substantial right of a decision
on a constitutional question by a federal tribunal. This ruling
is in the light of Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson, 3 which
holds that Congress cannot confer upon the Supreme Court of
the United States jurisdiction to review administrative or legis-
lative questions.
In this case there is the added problem of the constitutionality
of a state constitution that provides for administrative regula-
tion without recourse to the courts. Its solution on appeal should
fall within the purview of the Prentis decision. It is extremely
doubtful that the Oklahoma regulatory procedure provides "due
process."
Seven federal judges have taken part in the foregoing decisions
and on the various issues raised have upheld the constitutionality
of the Johnson Act. In all the cases, the existence of adequate
judicial review in some court of the state was involved. Without
it federal jurisdiction in matters of state utility regulation still
exists and the Prentis, Crowell v. Benson and Ben Avon rulings
will have to be taken into consideration by the state courts in
these and subsequent cases, if local regulation of local utilities
is to make headway.
33 (1932) 289 U. S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627, 77 L. Ed. 1166.
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